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This thesis examines and assesses the foundation of high-security events the methods for their 
implementation in Helsinki. Research was qualitative in nature and included aspects of opera-
tional research, id est interviews of two security professionals: Mr Jari Väinölä of Countsec 
Ltd. and Mr Oskari Salmi.  
 
The current state of affairs with regards to event security and the security situation as a 
whole, were presumed to be in high and good standing. High-security events were defined in 
this context as an event of high visibility and importance, but not organized by the Finnish 
State, as the actors and standard operating procedures on the public side differ greatly from 
those of the private sector. To provide further substance to the theory, risk analysis and as-
sessment methods were introduced to provide the reader with an understanding of risk man-
agement theories and methods of combatting complex threats to security. 
 
Through data analysis and on the basis of the accounts of Mr Väinölä and Mr Salmi, it was to 
be observed that some aspects and issues rose above else. These were the low level of pre-
paredness and pre-event planning, and the overall lack of security knowledge with the event 
organizers. Pointed out, that these were obvious gaps for the private sector to provide their 
services, but still the façon d’être of the organizing entity remained unaltered. Ultimately, 
the level of security was concluded to be as hypothesized, but there was still a distinct lack 
of knowledge in the private corporate security sector, moreover in the organizing team of an 
event, about the actual risks and the importance of communication (both internal and exter-
nal).  
 
Responding to the research question, a method for augmenting the level of professionalism in 
regards to high-security events and the scene in its entirety, the key recommendation is in-
creased research and the promulgation of the accumulated data onto universities and profes-
sional schools. 
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Tämän opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena on tutkia ja analysoida tämän hetkistä turvallisuustilan-
netta Helsingissä korkean turvallisuustason tapahtumia silmälläpitäen. Tutkimus oli luonteel-
taan kvalitatiivista, lainaten operatiivisen tutkimuksen metodeja haastatteluiden kautta. 
Haastatellut henkilöt olivat Countsec Oy:n toimitusjohtaja Jari Väinölä ja turvallisuusasian-
tuntija Oskari Salmi. 
 
Nykyisen turvallisuustilanteen ja korkean turvallisuustason tapahtumien ammattimaisuuden 
tason oletettiin olevan korkeita. Korkean turvallisuustason tapahtumat määriteltiin tämän 
tutkimuspaperin tekoa varten tapahtumiksi, jotka luonteeltaan olivat poikkeuksellisen näky-
viä tai tärkeitä, mutta eivät Suomen valtion järjestämiä. Tämä rajaus sisältää sekä kotimaiset 
että kansainväliset tapahtumat. Lukijan tietotaustan tueksi esiteltiin myös riskianalyysimeto-
deja, jotka myös tukevat tutkimuksen akateemista substanssia. 
 
Lähdeaineistoanalyysin ja haastatteluiden pohjalta pystyttiin havaitsemaan selkeitä yh-
teneväisyyksiä ja puutteita nykytilassa. Molemmat haastatelluista asiantuntijoista identifioi-
vat huonon etukäteisvarautumisen ja –suunnittelun suurimmaksi ongelmaksi, jossa vaikuttava-
na tekijänä toimi myös turvallisuusosaamisen puute tapahtumajärjestäjien taholla. Tässä oli 
huomattavissa, että kyseinen puutos tarjoaa yksityiselle turvallisuusosaamiselle markkinara-
on, mutta se ei vaikuta isäntäorganisaation turvallisuuskäyttäytymiseen keskipitkällä tai pit-
källä aikavälillä. Hypoteesit osoittautuivat tutkimuksen edetessä oikeiksi, mutta samalla oli 
havaittavissa selkeä tietotaidon puute turvallisuusasioissa yritysturvallisuustoimijoiden ja or-
ganisaatioiden tapahtumasta vastaavien osalta, erityisesti puutteet painottuivat riskien tie-
dostamiseen ja kommunikaation tärkeyden unohtumiseen. 
 
Tutkimuskysymykseen vastaten, tapa parantaa nykyistä ammattimaisuuden ja turvallisuuden 
tasoa tapahtumaturvallisuuden puitteissa on tutkimuksen lisääminen ja saavutetun tutkimus-
tiedon jakaminen turvallisuusalan koulutusta tarjoavien oppilaitosten opetussuunnitelmiin. 
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 Introduction
 
As the amount of events have increased and are likely to proceed in such a manner in the 
coming years (City of Helsinki, 2015), it is required for the hosting party to maintain and up-
hold a sufficient level of safety and security precautions to guarantee a safe execution of said 
occurrences. It is precisely this framework, in which this research is focused and which it 
aims at enhancing. This paper additionally examines and recommends aspects to be taken 
into consideration in regards to high-security events organized in Helsinki. All entities have 
their special set of needs and the requirements for the events thus change invariably, but 
regardless of the nature of the event, the core issues examined here remain the same. The 
notion of event security and safety umbrella refers to the precautions taken in safeguarding 
people and assets in an intermittent and one-off basis. Thus, the role and implementation 
methods for such scenes cannot be thoroughly standardized as they vary greatly from an 
event to another. 
 
Risk is a part of our everyday lives, and due consideration should be made on every step of 
the way, be it personal acquisitions or large-scale corporate decisions. Risks, on one part, 
define and dictate the course of our lives. A discussion and debate can be had on the level of 
risks willing to be taken when it varies considerable among individuals, as some prefer to take 
bigger risks in the hopes of a better outcome and vice versa. 
 
Regardless of the point of view, the existence of the spotlighted high-security events, dis-
cussed in this paper, is imperative. Such existence provides the framework for highly im-
portant corporate meetings to take place, sensitive diplomatic discussions to progress and 
other high visibility events to function unhindered. There are a wide range of views on the 
fundamental being of these events, as whether a civilized society should have a portion of 
itself confined behind bars and organize events with restricted access, thus the morality of 
such scrutinized by their fellow citizens. Nevertheless, such is the status quo and the means 
to its conservation have become not only more complex, but paramount, in order for the 
same society to fulfil it’s premise to its citizens.   
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1 Literature review 
 
Events and crowds as individual entities have been thoroughly researched through different 
points of view, from sociology to natural sciences. It is thus the definition and the framework 
set by the author and the researcher that dictate the walls around the focused aspect. Due to 
the security management background of this research, it is expedient to focus on the observ-
able sciences and only refer the definitions to the philosophical side; successful security, af-
ter all, is the end result of managed risks. 
 
The cohesive factor within the related literature (and security itself) stems from the basic 
human instinct for self-preservation and, thus, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1943). 
The concept of security is derived from these needs, directly succeeding the life and death 
requirements for food, water, warmth and rest. This is to say that humans have an intrinsic 
need to be safe and secure. After these conditions have been met, an individual may pursue 
higher desires such as the need for intimate relationships and ultimately self-actualisation. 
The existence of and assurance received from properly executed security and safety measures 
are thusly irreplaceable, even more so with the modern man. The management of risks and 
the derived security planning has come a long way since the days of Maslow. 
 
A vast majority of the literature within the field of risk management and high-security events 
are textbook style manuals, and are, for some parts, obsolete. The nature of high-security 
events has changed dramatically a number of times during the past two decades. Some exam-
ples of this literature, written in the 90’s, base their points and facts on lessons learned from 
post soviet-collapse environment where the threats were clear and factual. Today, the same 
does not fore-go without criticism, as the nature of risks and potential threats to such events 
have become increasingly more asymmetrical and unconventional. The threat of terrorism is a 
prime example: it’s existence has been known and alive for almost a century (starting from 
the beginning of WWI anarchists) but never prior to 9/11 has it been given so much considera-
tion and precautions taken to combat the risks. The current state and the threat of terrorism 
in Finland are discussed in the chapter 3.2.1. 
 
The theoretical point of view with regards to risks and accidents is worthy of acknowledge-
ment. A myriad of ways have been used to define and determine, and to illustrate the cause 
and causality ratio of these concepts. For in the case of accidents, the first attempt at such 
was H.W. Heinrich’s “Domino Theory” in 1936. It is not, by any standard, the most sophisti-
cated or comprehensive of accident theories, but perhaps the most widely used. The obvious 
reference is to the behaviour of a set of domino pieces placed next to each other, and thus 
when one of the pieces fall, subsequently all the other will tumble accordingly. This, accord-
ing to Heinrich, demonstrates the process of accident causation. One is to be reminded here, 
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that accidents form an integral part of risk management and hence should not be neglected 
even in this review. Mr Heinrich determined the five stages of the “Domino Theory”, as fol-
lows: the first stage being the risk assorted with social environment and ancestry, second 
stage the comprehensive set of faults of a person (personal attributes leading to accidents), 
third being general unsafe acts or conditions (initiation of an incident), fourth the accident 
itself and the last being injury. The key to the concept of the theory is to remove one of the 
stages in order to prevent the injury or harm; this can be achieved through policymaking or 
physical means. Other theories to be mentioned are Ferrell’s “human factor model” and Pe-
tersen’s “Accident/incident”-model. More in depth analysis of the theories remains a topic 
for another research.  
 
Methods of risk management and the theory behind it can be partly derived from Heinrich’s 
theory, but equally form a subsequent set of definitions and processes of causation unbe-
knownst to the field of accidents. Risk management theories and issues are discussed in the 
chapter 2.3 of this paper.  
 
2 Expert methodology and definitions 
 
2.1 Research methods 
 
Here, research methods refer to the type of study conducted to produce this thesis as an end-
result of an examination process. Depending on the needs and type of a given research, the 
according tools and methods are to be applied. For this paper, it was concluded that the 
model of qualitative research complementing the founding’s of an operational study would 
result in the most suitable outcome. The definitions and tools of such methods will be dis-
cussed in the chapter 3.1.1. 
 
Other common research methodologies include the positivist and qualitative research model, 
which precede the qualitative methodology. The respective methodology should be appoint 
per research through observation of research focus and ideas, as the nature of data cannot be 
effectively analysed through all methods (for example: census statistics through qualitative 
approach). 
 
Research questions and hypotheses were set for this thesis. The thesis aims to respond and 
deliver information on the following aspects: 
 What is the current situation in Helsinki, in regards to security of events? 
 How can this situation and level of security be adjusted and augmented? 
 What is the purpose of high level of security with regards to event planning? 
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Following the research questions, some hypotheses were set on this basis. It was expected 
and hypothesized that the overall security situation is good and the related threat level to 
international events in Helsinki is relatively low. The aspects of security in high-security 
events examined here were postulated to be in good standing but that they could be honed 
through improved strategy approaches, technical equipment, efficient training and increased 
communication between event organisers. 
 
2.1.1 Qualitative and operational research 
 
Research is the process of arriving to a conclusion or to procure new information on a set sub-
ject through analysis of available data. The data can be collected in amplitude of fashion, 
thus defining the methodology used.  As defined in the planning phase of this thesis, the qual-
itative approach complemented with operational research were chosen for the purpose of 
data analysis and procurement. 
 
The qualitative research model yields its existence to the rejection of research positivism, 
where it was assumed that an objective world exists where necessary data can be collected 
and the data later verified through empiricism (Seale 2004). The qualitative model is a meth-
odological research method, where data is collected through a variety of tools, with the most 
common one being ‘key informant interview’ and following the use of focus groups. Other 
tools might be shadowing, storytelling or other participant observation methods. 
 
As part of the qualitative research approach, this thesis was conducted mainly in an empiri-
cist manner with additional interviews designed to adhere to the initial substance procured, 
so as to produce more informational value and expert input. 
 
Theory behind the implications and recommendations made in this paper are founded on ex-
pert literature and industry materials, as well as on best practices conducted in the field. The 
two interviews conducted for this paper are subjective by nature (as interviews generally 
are), and thus should only be considered to represent the ideology and opinion of the inter-
viewed expert. 
 
It was noted during the research process that some of the information relating, in particular, 
to the risk assessment of events from the government’s side are secret in nature and thus 
cannot be discussed or examined here further. However, the reader should be aware of the 
existence of such assessment processes even when it is not emphasised or discussed in this 
paper. Additionally, the data procured and produced here is bound to change over time as the 
industry progresses technically, and the socio-economic atmosphere is subject to constant 
transformation. 
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2.2 Defining the concepts 
 
Concepts in risk management and, more broadly, in the whole of the field of security are to 
be carefully defined in order for them to be effectively discussed. A great deal of such con-
cepts may prove to be perplexing for a person not familiar with the sector. This chapter dis-
cusses, details and defines the concepts and provides related terminology.  
 
2.2.1 Concepts in security and event management 
 
In regards to terminology, one has to keep in mind, that as security and risk management as 
terms can be used to describe a multitude of entities or processes, the definition of the term 
might slightly differ from the classical examples given here. For example, if one is to discuss 
risk management in the context of chemistry, one is likely to run into toxicology and biosafe-
ty – whereas the same term can be also attributed to aspects of physical safeguards of a 
building.  
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Term 
 
Definition 
 
Alternative definition 
 
 
Risk 
 
Exposure to the chance of injury 
or loss 
Someone or something that cre-
ates or suggests a hazard 
 
Security 
 
The quality or state of being 
secure 
Things done to make people or 
places safe 
 
Threat 
 
Indication of something impend-
ing 
Expression of intention to inflict 
evil, injury or damage 
 
Hazard 
 
A source of danger 
Something causing unavoidable 
danger, peril, risk or difficulty 
 
Asset 
 
A useful or desirable thing or 
quality 
An item of value owned 
 
Terrorism 
 
The use of violence and threats 
to intimidate or coerce 
The state of fear and submission 
produced by terrorism or terrori-
zation 
 
Event 
 
Something that happens or is 
regarded as happening 
Something that occurs in a cer-
tain place during a particular 
interval of time 
 
High-level 
 
Being of high importance or rank 
Occurring, done or placed at a 
high-level 
 
(Definitions by Merriam-Webster dictionary, 2015) 
The terms defined above were chosen on the basis of the level of precision required for this 
research: in general context the definitions for such terms might differ decisively. 
 
Focusing in the core aspect of this research, the existence and level of ‘high-security’, a high 
security event can be defined, for the purposes of this paper, as an event organised by some 
other entity than the state of Finland and where the need for protection from harm (be they 
physical damage to personnel or equipment, public image distortions or general disruptions) is 
more elevated than in a normal event open for public. This definition may include, but is not 
limited to: 
 International artist’s concert or exhibition 
 General meeting of a multinational company 
 Scientific or religious meeting 
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 Other meeting, where one or more of the participants are politically, economically or 
religiously of high importance 
 Exhibition or event where extremely valuable assets or items are handled or trans-
ported 
 
Term of event security was described by Mr Väinölä as: “a concept extensively incorporating 
“hard” security” as well as embedding aspects of safety. 
 
2.3 Risk assessment and analysis explained 
 
In the security industry and with every actor or entity aspiring to gain a financial or techno-
logical edge on competition, risks are bound to be taken. Be they physical, financial or ab-
stract – security in its nature includes and manages the mitigation of risks. 
 
Entities, depending on the industry and set of goals, have different reasons for managing and 
mitigating risks. Risk analysis, as such, is merely a management tool – a definition determined 
by the executive management as what it is ready to accept as loss. One must keep in mind 
that, risk analysis, as with everything related to the assessment of risks in the field of securi-
ty (i.e. excluding scientific risk analysis in chemistry, toxicology etc.) is subjective and not an 
absolute science. However, risk analysis is an orderly and rational approach into examining 
the probabilities and consequences of an adverse effect (Broder, J; Tucker, E; 2012). 
 
As a management and directional tool, risk analysis is invaluable. It will provide the decision-
making actors with factual information on corporate processes and overall security, as to 
counter the potentially false sense and image of security. This eliminates, if properly execut-
ed and only to some extent, the human error aspect of management in security matters as it 
erases unfounded notions. In a practical sense, it also assembles and conceptualizes the secu-
rity matters, which can then, in turn, be used as justifications for costly countermeasures 
(Broder, J; Tucker, E, 2012). 
 
According to Broder (Broder, J; Tucker, E, 2012) risk analysis should be carried out by first 
identifying the assets to be protected, following the identification of threats and risks on 
those particular assets and finally determining the probability of the risks occurring to those 
assets. An integral part of a thorough risk analysis is ‘risk exposure assessment’, in which 
three further aspects are to be examined: 
1. Determining the types of losses that can affect the assets 
a. What effect would the risk have? 
2. Estimate the probability of occurrence of said risks 
3. Measure the impact of the risk 
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These aspects are to be measures and examined in quantitative terms so as to produce com-
parable data. 
 
2.3.1 Risk assessment techniques 
 
There are a good variety of risk assessment techniques publicly available and more are being 
constantly produced. Hereafters are presented a few in broad uses. The following methods 
presented are some of the 31 techniques listed in the Annex B of ISO/IEC 31010. 
 
Brainstorming 
 
As the title indicates, brainstorming relies mainly on individual or group creativity than on 
scientific methods. The desired result is often a conclusion to an identified problem achieved 
through group collaboration. This collaboration should be spontaneous in style and in a way 
where all members are encouraged to contribute, so as to produce diversified points of view 
that can then, in turn, be shortlisted to result into a common conclusion. 
 
Alex F. Osborn, the father of the concept, claimed that two principles contribute to “ideative 
efficacy” more than others: 
 Defer judgement 
 Reach for quantity 
To hone these principles further, he developed the method further, which then resulted in 
the following intentions for the brainstorming sessions: 
 Reducing social inhibitions between group members 
 Stimulate idea generation 
 Increase overall creativity of the group 
o Focus on quantity 
o No criticism 
o Welcome unusual ideas 
o Combine and improve ideas 
(Isaksen, 1998) 
 
Brainstorming can be somewhat effectively applied to basic level risk management and as-
sessment, but without thorough empirical knowledge and technical skills of the group mem-
bers, the results might prove to be infertile. 
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Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) 
 
The HAZOP-method is a tool to assess and identify risks of current or future processes, so as 
to weed out threats to personnel and/or equipment. It comprises mainly of a multidisciplinary 
team, which conducts the analysis through a course of meetings. The meeting should be lead 
by a chairman competent in safety matters. The method is, in its nature, qualitative and like 
with brainstorming, it is designed to stimulate participants’ imagination and then honing the 
outcome with guidewords. Initially developed to assess risks in chemical processes (incl. toxi-
cology) and mining operations, but has later extended into use with nuclear power plants and 
other sensitive system processes. 
 
The method has been criticized for being too time consuming and rather expensive. Addition-
ally, very detailed plans of certain processes are required to properly execute the study. 
(Health and safety laboratory, 2005). 
 
Scenario analysis 
 
Scenario analysis can be used as a risk assessment method and a way of improving decision-
making. In short, it provides the authors of the study a set of possible views of future, scenar-
ios, which can each be assessed separately. Projections being the main method of analysis, 
the method will yield a variety of different outcome scenarios and the individual paths lead-
ing up to those particular outcomes. This is done in order to better examine the possible situ-
ations and thus be effectively prepared for every scenario sought out. Importantly, it does not 
rely on historical data and thus does not assume the observations/projections to be true in 
the future. 
 
Business impact analysis (BIA) 
 
Business impact analysis is usually seen as being an integral part of the business continuity 
planning process. As such, during the analysis phase of the planning process, the ‘business 
impact analysis’ offers the authors/receiving entity a differentiation of critical and non-
critical functions of a given entity. The division between the two categories varies per case, 
but can be generalized in matters, which effectively disrupt or halt business operations (i.e. 
unacceptable ones) being labelled as critical and the rest as non-critical. The definition of 
criticality can be extensive, as a disruption of a business process may occur from purely tech-
nical issues to legal obstacles.  
 
Some important definitions for use within the BIA-framework: 
 MTPD: Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption 
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o The maximum amount of time key processes of the entity may be unavailable 
before disruption of service occurs 
 RTO: Recovery Time Objective 
o An agreed frame of time in which the processes must be recovered 
 RPO: Recovery Point Objective 
o The interval of time that might pass during a major disruption before the 
quantity of lost data exceeds the limits of the business continuity plan 
(Singh, 2008) 
 
The process starts with assigning two values for each critical function, the RTO and RPO, then 
following the setting of recovery requirements for each of these functions. 
 
 
2.3.2 ISO certificates 
 
Certificating and accrediting certain aspects of corporate services, including security and risk 
management, does have a positive effect on overall image of said entity and ideally helps to 
boost better corporate culture. Certification/accreditation is sought by many also for reasons 
of public image through credibility; additionally achieving a certification may boost the cus-
tomer’s trust on the service/good. The most notable standards within the risk management 
spectrum are found in the ISO 31000 family. The standard family includes, among others: 
 ISO 31000:2009 – Principles and Guidelines on Implementation 
 ISO/IEC 31010:2009 – Risk Management – Risk assessment techniques 
 ISO Guide 73:2009 – Risk Management – Vocabulary 
 
The above-mentioned family of standards provides a standard for the corporate implementa-
tion of risk management. 
 
3 High level security events in Helsinki 
 
3.1 Brief history 
 
Given its status of diplomatic non-alignment, Finland, and notably Helsinki as its capital, has 
had a long and fruitful track record of various successful high-level events and international 
conferences. 
 
Even as this paper focuses on events where the organiser is some other party than the state 
of Finland, it would be hypocrite to disregard the most notable conference of recent Finnish 
history. In July 1975, named as the ‘Helsinki Accords’, an act was signed in the Finlandia hall 
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in central Helsinki. It was the climax of the first Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE) in which thirty-five states joined to sign the declaration, in order to enhance 
diplomatic relations between the communist eastern bloc and the West. It is this year, 2015, 
when an OSCE meeting shall also take place in Helsinki, in honour of this first Act.  
 
Remaining with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), a ministerial 
council was summoned in Helsinki (as Finland held chairmanship) in 2008, where a record of 
50 foreign ministers gathered to discuss current topics, and the Georgian crisis topped the 
agenda. (OSCE 2008) 
 
Since 1995, when Finland officially joined the European Union, a number of EU-internal meet-
ings have taken place over the decades in Helsinki. Even if it would seem at first glance, that 
these events are organised by the Finnish state, they are, in fact coordinated separately by 
the organising entities in Finland (including the Commission representation in Helsinki) and 
the arriving party. Thus, as a basis, these events remain within the scope of this research. 
 
Some of the more influential, high-level EU meetings organised in Helsinki include the 2006 
Finnish presidency visits of the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament, EU-
China summit, EU-Republic of Korea summit, ASEM 6 (Asia-Europe Meeting) and the EU-Russia 
summit. A notable incident with these events was the rioting related to ASEM 6, which caused 
major disturbances in the city centre and required a tremendous amount of police (and bor-
der guard) presence at the scene. The authorities were later criticised for their alleged use of 
excess force and apprehension of bystanders (YLE24, Helsingin Sanomat). 
 
3.2 Current standing 
 
Traditionally Finland and Helsinki have a good and relatively clean track record related to 
security incidents and that has yet to be changed. 
 
Current global security standing has changed dramatically during the past year, due to the on-
going conflict in Ukraine, Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the war in Syria 
and Iraq. Several European countries have warned their citizens to remain vigilant as the risk 
of a terrorist attack is currently heightened, partly due to individuals who have fought in Syr-
ia and Iraq returning to their countries of origin and may potentially bring extremist acts 
alongside their return (British government). 
 
Nevertheless, Finland has a reputation of an excellent police force and a stable political and 
economic environment. Overall crime statistics remain very low compared to the majority of 
other developed countries. (US Department of State) 
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3.2.1 Terrorism 
 
The threat level of terrorism in Finland is low. (UK Government; US Department of State) As 
stated in the previous paragraph, there is, however, a heightened risk of terrorist acts global-
ly due to the current state of geopolitical instability in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. 
This should be taken into special consideration if the guest line-up of the event consists main-
ly of citizens of countries taking part in the coalition against jihadist groups in the Middle East 
and even more so, if these guest are of American nationality. Nationality of event partici-
pants and country-specific risks will be discussed in following chapters.  
 
Another issue are the individuals acting alone. Individuals acting as “lone wolves” have 
spurred a lot of discussion in the light of two relatively recent school shootings in Kauhajoki 
and Jokela in 2007 and 2008. The two cases were categorised as acts of a lone individual who 
was motivated merely by the discontentment to their personal lives and frustration with the 
government and its policies (BBC News, 2007). These acts have a lot in common with the 
Norwegian mass murderer Breivik, who shot and killed a total of 77 individuals on a youth so-
cial democrat summer camp on an island called Utøya, near Oslo in 2011. The incidents re-
ferred are incredibly rare, but remain a constant possibility and thus a threat to by-standers, 
which may include event participants and/or organisers. However, it is not feasible to plan 
for these situations specifically, but rather to proceed with a general evacuation and escape 
plan for individuals of high political or financial importance requiring special close protection. 
 
Since 2003, six individuals were charged with collaborating with the Somali terrorist group al-
Shabaab under the Finnish terrorism laws. In connection, the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service has introduced a number of reforms to effectively counter the slightly rising threat of 
terrorism, as best practices are shared between the Nordic countries. (US Department of 
State). 
 
3.2.2 Organised crime 
 
Organised crime in the Finnish legislation is defined as a group of at least 3 individuals, acting 
for a set period of time and with an organised structure, collaborating in making crimes, of 
which the minimum sentence is at least four years. (FINLEX, National Bureau of Investigation, 
2014) However, a different set of criteria concerning the definition of organised crime is set 
in a variety of EU-documents. Thus, the criminal gangs acting in Finland are divided into two 
categories: ones falling under the umbrella of EU-criterion and other organised crime collabo-
rative. Until up to the end of the last decade, an alarming increase was to be observed in the 
numbers of the more dangerous, EU-criterion category groups. However, since the peak year 
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of 2011 the numbers have remained steady. According to police officials, there are currently 
approximately 80 organised crime groups. (National Bureau of Investigation, 2014) 
 
Despite the majority of the actors being groups with Finnish origins, organised crime, in its 
nature, often requires international cooperation, the groups operating in Finland are, as well, 
highly connected to Europe and the rest of the world. (National Bureau of Investigation, 2014)  
 
Organised crime typically occurs in the form of human and drug trafficking, smuggling and 
prostitution. However, the main sources of income for the crime groups, especially motorcy-
cle groups (which are the majority of the groups labelled ‘organised crime’), are the offering 
of security services and drug trafficking. (National Bureau of Investigation, 2014.) 
 
While not as prominent as in several other countries, the existence of organised crime in Fin-
land is something to take into due consideration, especially if high-risk individuals are partici-
pating in a given event. Kidnapping and/or harming the individual, if he/she is somehow of 
importance to the crime group, is not excluded anywhere in the world.  The proximity of Rus-
sia is a factor when examining the threat and risk from organised crime to an event, as Rus-
sian criminals and organised crime syndicates are not (necessarily) confined to their borders. 
These Russian groups are far more extended and often more sophisticated than their Finnish 
counterparts, so prudence is of the greatest use. 
 
3.2.3 Petty crime 
 
As with any capital city, Helsinki suffers from common crime including burglaries, pickpocket-
ing, robberies etc. These are often crimes of opportunity, as most of the crimes relate to or-
ganised crime groups (US Department of State). Violent crime is a trending phenomenon in 
Finland, but often times results from intoxication and partly domestically. 
 
Alcohol has traditionally been a major source of misbehaviour and contributes to criminal ac-
tivity. The use of alcohol is easily visible in the nightlife of Helsinki and one does not need to 
seek for long to find intoxicated individuals. Public drinking and the related violent behaviour 
remain the largest challenge for the local police and thus efforts have been made to try to 
curb trend. Of violence on the street, 80% of the perpetrators are under the influence of an 
intoxicant (US Department of State). 
 
The use of narcotics has slightly risen over the past decade, but remains generally low com-
pared to other European countries, as Finland is primarily a transit point for traffickers rather 
than a destination. 
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3.2.4 Accidents, weather and other hazards 
 
As a Nordic country, Finland experiences long, cold and dark winters, which may dramatically 
affect the safety on the road and render sidewalks impassable. Being on the southern end of 
Finland, Helsinki is spared from the most freezing temperatures but the high winds blowing 
from the Finnish bay together with daily mean sub-zero degrees can make the atmosphere 
intolerable for tourists. The lowest temperature measured in Helsinki was -34.3C in 1987. 
 
3.3 Protection values and recommendations 
 
High-security and other special events pose unique challenges for the security personnel and 
organiser. Every special event has different requirements due to the changing nature and at-
mosphere of the event, as one has to prepare very differently for a rock concert than to a 
general meeting. Even if the events falling under the category of ‘high-security’ might be var-
ied in type, they all share some of the same principles by which security actors and profes-
sionals should assess the potentiality for risks and hazards. 
 
If event being assessed and planned is a public event, the organizer is responsible of inform-
ing the Finnish Police, in this case the Helsinki Police Department, of their intentions to ar-
range one and might have to provide the authorities a detailed security plan. This is purely 
routine and the Finnish authorities seldom bother themselves with bringing up issues if there 
is none. As stated earlier, they will conduct a risk analysis of their own and adjust their re-
sponse on that basis. The organizer might be exempt from this responsibility, if the event is 
small (few participants), or due to the nature or location of the event does not require any 
actions by the authorities to guarantee public safety and security. Special traffic control is-
sues will be discussed in the following sections and in some cases they oblige the organizer to 
this necessity of informing. The notification has to be made minimum five (5) days prior to 
the event; the notification form in electronic format can be found on the website of the Finn-
ish Police (http://www.poliisi.fi). If, due to the nature of the event, it is deemed necessary 
for the organizer to provide documentation of their insurance, it will be requested prior to 
the event. (Finnish Police, 2014).  
 
Additionally, the organizer of a public meeting is responsible for notifying the Police at least 
six (6) hours prior to the commencement of the meeting. The notification can be either ver-
bal or written, but must be given and/or left at the local precinct. A notification may also be 
considered valid if given late, if due to the nature of the meeting it does not pose a particular 
risk to the public. Such a notification can be made (recommended), about a demonstration of 
only a specified few individuals, with the only intention of informing the authorities of a par-
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ticular occurrence. In such a case, the event is covered under the provisions of the Assembly 
Act, except § 5.  
 
3.3.1 Outsourcing security provisions 
 
For the vast majority of SME’s (small and medium-sized enterprises), outsourcing security ar-
rangements and services is a cost-effective solution and saves the management some of the 
headache. It is commonplace for high security event organizers to use contracted guard-
ing/security services, if they are not inherently specialized in security themselves. Outsourc-
ing can be the best answer in the procurement of security services, if the event is unusual or 
temporary, the purchasing entity is not capable of providing the required manpow-
er/expertise or the costs of doing so result in excessive expenditures (Davies, S et al. 2008.) 
 
There are many ways to scout out and find a suitable service provider, whether it would be a 
large private security company or a team of known close protection officers (provided that 
they act as a company). One must note at this point, that in order to exist and operate in the 
Finnish market, a security company has to be licensed, if it is providing security guard ser-
vices. The licensing process is fairly straightforward, but does require at least one of the core 
members of the company to have undergone a special training (required by Finnish law, 
12.4.2002/282) to become the designated duty manager. The duty manager is responsible for 
the correct guidance of the company, to ensure that the operations are managed as legislat-
ed. The licensing is provided by the National Police Board. 
 
Prior to examining the potential security service candidates, one must carefully examine the 
current situation of the hosting organisation and conduct a thorough analysis (cost-benefit 
and current capabilities). This initiates the process to determine the costs related to the out-
sourcing process. In certain situations, a contrast has to be made between a third-party, out-
sourced, security service and a proprietary security service. Following the initial analysis, one 
has to identify and quantify liability issues and their costs. (Davies, S et al. 2008) The type of 
the event influences these numbers tremendously, so care is encouraged in its implementa-
tion. According to Hertig and Watson (Davies, S et al. 2008), a significant financial gain can 
be achieved through the process of outsourcing, as the incurring wages and other labour re-
lated costs result in lower total cost. Additionally, the reduction of liabilities can be seen as a 
way of facilitating corporate bureaucracy and lowering the burden of legal stipulations. 
 
Advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing security services for the purpose a high security 
event include, but are not limited to: 
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Advantages 
 Lower total costs (often the main reason for procurement) 
 Less management burden in matters of HR; additional streamlining of existing admin-
istrative diagram, as the purchasing entity only has to deal with a few individuals 
from the service provider’s side 
 Mitigating liabilities 
 
Disadvantages 
 Loyalty of personnel might suffer 
 Asset protection cannot be entirely outsourced; third-party actors only facilitate par-
tially 
 Minimal control (see streamlining of administration) 
 
(Davies, S et al. 2008) 
 
3.3.2 Pre- and post-event briefings 
 
A preliminary meeting between all the actors in the organizing structure of an event is strong-
ly recommended in order to ensure that everyone follows the steps accordingly. This pre-
event briefing would be ideally conducted as a walkthrough, where all posts and critical cus-
tomer “touchpoints” would be checked and verified. All responsibilities, duties, approaches 
and objectives should be clearly defined. The briefing should be planned and structured on 
the basis of the needs of the event, and the predefined outlines being sent to all participants 
prior to the meeting. 
 
In practical terms, all the individuals participating in the organizing of the event are required 
to attend and to see to all aspects of the set-up with an equal level of interest. This should 
not be approached as a mere strategy meeting, but rather to pragmatically ascertain that all 
aspects are physically set up accordingly, equipment verified and personnel aware of their 
duties. Emergency exits are to be checked and shown to all participants. Additionally, this 
provides everyone the possibility to clear up any questions and misconceptions. 
 
One should not forget the importance of a post-event briefing either, which is a prime occa-
sion for increasing intellectual information (thus expertise) through addressing all issues aris-
en during or prior to the event. The organizers should go through all the same aspects as they 
did in the preliminary meeting and discuss the results. An overall summary should be drafted 
to facilitate the projection of these incidents and learning events for the future events. 
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3.3.3 Assessment of crowds 
 
According to Christopher Innace (Davies, S et al. 2008) a common factor and the most threat-
ening issue is the behaviour of crowds. He points out that crowds are capable of extensive 
violence and other misbehaviour due to the innate nature of human’s group behaviour, which 
should be countered through effective crowd management measures. 
 
The nature and type of a crowd dictates the majority of measures implemented to counter 
the related risks. Small, but high security level events may not be affected as much by crowd 
behaviour as peer pressure for good manners and self-control exceed those of disturbance. It 
is often the case, that in a familiar setting (i.e. familiar people) an individual is less likely to 
commit indecent acts or acts of mischief. This is reversed when the individual joins a large 
crowd and often loses his/her individuality resulting thus to a behaviour which would not 
normally be tolerated. 
 
According to Innace, there are five different types of crowds: 
 
- Acquisitive 
o Acquisitive crowds are motivated by the desire of acquisition through receiv-
ing an item or meeting a person; if this need is fulfilled quite efficiently the 
crowd tends to remain calm and composed. 
- Expressive 
o Expressive crowds refer to a group of individuals expressing an opinion or 
feelings, usually in a demonstration or protest. Oftentimes remains calm and 
well behaved, but has the potentiality to become hostile. 
- Spectator 
o Spectator crowd is a group of individuals settling to watching a certain event 
or incident. Emotions may change rapidly if proper factors arise. 
- Hostile 
o Hostile crowds are motivated by feelings of anger and/or fear towards which-
ever entity they are faced with. Such crowd often resorts to the use violence 
to obtain their desire. Occurs in political rallies, riots and demonstrations. 
This is the type of crowd, which needs to be dispersed rapidly to avoid exten-
sive damage to property and/or personnel. 
- Escape 
o Escape crowds are people trying to flee from something. This type of incident 
might occur during an emergency situation (natural disaster, fire, fight etc.), 
but can also be the result of a badly managed security force. Thus, special 
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care must be carried out to make sure that crowds do not get too large or get 
confined. Necessity of good evacuation routes is paramount. 
 
Group dynamics and psychology are for the most part universal and thus no special emphasis 
needs to be made in order for an event to be made suitable for Helsinki. If anything, Finns are 
regarded as being calmer than their European counterparts and do not tolerate violence of 
any sort in public. (US Department of State).  
 
Tightly knit with overall group dynamics is the manner in which one is to address a crowd. 
The way in which an individual responds or lacks a response is all in the context of the group, 
which might be very different to the private opinions of the person. The following rules 
should be kept in mind: 
 Be concise with the delivery of the message 
 Prior to the delivery, get the undivided attention of the crowd through a signal (ver-
bal message or another sound) 
 Address the crowd in a calm and clear manner 
 Try to establish an eye contact to express authority (with all members of the crowd) 
 Be firm and persuasive; above all, be polite 
(Innace, 2008) 
 
3.3.4 Traffic control 
 
Organisers and the security personnel of an event need to consider traffic control measures 
already well prior to the event, as larger measures may require a permit from Helsinki City 
Council or the local police district. If in doubt, the organizer should verify this need from the 
local police, as there are no set minimum standards.  
 
In a normal setting, it is the Finnish Police who deals with traffic control issues and handles 
the logistical procedures related to visits from heads of states etc. However, as the police 
force is slightly understaffed it does not concern itself with the physical implementation of 
other traffic control measures, except in an obvious emergency. Therefore measures and pro-
cedures made to an individual event need to be conducted with private personnel.  
 
Traffic control measures are often of high visibility and therefore require good planning and 
equipment. Upon arrival to the event venue, implementation of the traffic control measures 
are part of the first aspect which the visitors see (also visible to passers-by) and thusly wields 
a potential impact on the public image of both the event organiser and the security entity. 
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Implementation methods for traffic control procedures for one-off events are simple, but im-
portant. Certain rules of thumb and generalities can be made for the purpose of facilitating 
these logistics. Security personnel designated for traffic duty need to be identifiable through 
their clothing and equipment. Minimum requirements for clothing should be that it is uni-
formed, preferably with a high-visibility vest and suited to weather to allow the personnel to 
remain in their post for extended periods of time. Equipment for the security personnel 
should consist of at least a flashlight, radio and a whistle. 
 
As for local premise preparations related to traffic control, there should be one lane or lot 
reserved for the purpose of emergency vehicles and evacuations. This facilitates the extrac-
tion of medical emergency patients, but additionally the evacuation of other guests and quick 
removal of evicted or arrested individuals. The ability to rapidly remove potential perpetra-
tors and the handling of incidents in a manner not visible to the guests has its advantages. A 
security company offering their services to these events should be equally concerned with the 
image of both their own personnel but also that of the client, and thus the handling of sensi-
tive situations discreetly goes a long way. Prior to the event, the lane may also serve as a 
quick-stop loading/unloading area, where general supplies and security equipment can be 
delivered. A good while prior to the beginning of the event, the lanes should be closed and 
used only for matters of emergency. These rules can be relaxed only after the last guest of 
event has left. 
 
3.3.5 Communications and liaisons 
 
According to Mr Jari Väinölä, a long-serving police officer and an the ex security director of 
Sampo Bank group, communication between the security company, the organizing team and 
even the hosting party’s external communications team is paramount to the success of an 
event. The importance of communication cannot be stressed enough as the basis for all analy-
sis is the acknowledgement of all possible risks and outcomes, which cannot be assessed and 
more importantly, identified, in a solitary manner. A security service provider should not be a 
security “purist”, but rather to conform to the needs of the client and the entity being 
served. Thus, as a client might have a largely different view on security matters than those of 
the security entity, a common ground and a compromise needs to be found in order for the 
preparations to be conducted accordingly. This would be the starting point all of event prepa-
rations and the same level of communication between the actors have to continue throughout 
the process. This is in order for the security aspects to be embedded into all sections of the 
planning process and implementations. As stated, communication is an embedded, not a sep-
arate, part of the process. 
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Another point to be made in regards to communication arrangements in general would be that 
a well thought-out procedure should be in place in case of a security anomaly or disruption, 
so as to effectively counter all possible negative outcomes. For example, this would be a situ-
ation where the security entity effectively tackles a security incident, which is simultaneously 
communicated to the communications team who then produces a piece of public information 
prior to rumours spreading out. 
 
On the field, communication methods for security officers and other related event actors 
should be implemented so as to be able to communicate and exchange information between 
all entities: for example with the use of portable radios with each entity using their own 
channel (ex. authorities on channel 1, event organisers on channel 2 etc.). Back-up batteries 
and equipment should be at hand at all times. Secondary means of communication are a must 
in a high security event, so as to be able to resort to a functional line/channel and for the 
tools to be able to accommodate the increase in traffic during emergency situations. The 
functionality of the communication equipment should be checked at every possible time, to 
make sure that the transmission and reception capabilities of radios and other methods are 
working accordingly. 
 
3.3.6 Evacuation procedures 
 
In public events, as with all buildings comprising of at least three residential apartments, a 
dedicated emergency plan is mandatory (SPEK, 2014). In an emergency plan evacuation pro-
cedures and routes are to be specified. In depth emergency plans and guidelines for creating 
one are plenty, but some of the aspects to be detailed are the place of assembly, and instruc-
tion on what is to follow an evacuation (be it instructions from management or redirection 
towards a parking a lot etc.). Innace specifies, that a cordon of approximately 2 meters 
should be implemented around the inside of the perimeter, if possible or if the event is held 
outdoors.  
 
In terms of the government’s civil defence, according to the Rescue Act (29.4.2011/379), the 
relevant authorities are required to participate in the planning of evacuation procedures 
when dealing with events or locations of national interest (Helsinki City Rescue Department, 
2015). In practice, the scope of this responsibility is very limited and reserved only to events 
including an extraordinarily large number of participants. The main task for the authorities in 
this respect is to provide guidelines and evacuation procedures for the government and local 
jurisdictions for national emergency purposes. One must keep in mind that the contents of 
this paper are no substitute for a thorough and well-executed emergency and security plan, 
which embeds the related content mentioned here. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
A variety of information resources and interviews conducted for the purposes of this thesis all 
explicitly agree on the common questions regarding the level of professionalism in event se-
curity and the current security situation in Helsinki. However, after data analysis, a few is-
sues were identified above others. 
 
On the global scale Finland and Helsinki are almost ‘safe havens’ with regards to public secu-
rity and the efficiency of law enforcement agencies. In addition, strict regulation is a con-
tributing factor to this sense of security and overall good performance on international com-
parisons. While criticized in it’s home country, the level of regulation yields an exceptional 
level of thoroughness and precision in safety and security auditing of public and private do-
mains. Implemented through overseeing government authorities, these regulations and their 
fulfilment are constantly monitored by the Finnish police and the local Rescue departments 
(and the customs, where applicable). In regards to event planning, a variety of permits and 
codes have to be fulfilled in order for a public event to take place, and even with private 
events the establishment and buildings need to succumb to the same scrutiny to make sure 
fire code is respected and that the guests are not in any foreseeable peril. As a result, the 
default level of security is augmented through scrutinized planning processes in part of the 
authorities, but also the high level of human capital observed in the Nordic countries yielding 
reliable results. One might also get the illusion from the analysis of the current situation that 
there are no considerable risks to worry about when organizing events in Helsinki. This illu-
sion of a lull in security issues should be treated as one, but the fact remains that Helsinki 
experiences an overall safe and secure environment, due to the many contributing factors 
discussed in this paper.  
 
Deriving from the interviews of Mr Väinölä and Mr Salmi, both identified a key deficiency in 
today’s event planning to the be the low level of knowledge in matters of security and the 
lack or minimal amount of security preparations. As suggested in chapter 3.3.2, an emphasis 
on pre-event planning could be seen as a method of increasing the overall level of security 
while simultaneously augmenting the level of professionalism greatly. All actors within the 
organizing team of an event are not to be expected to possess in-depth knowledge in security 
issues but this should be countered through increased and effective communication between 
the planning actors, where it is often the case, that each member represents one aspect of 
the event’s entirety. In this manner, issues concerning not only security, could be taken into 
consideration and risks managed as efficiently as possible. According to Mr Väinölä, communi-
cation between the organizers and the authorities should be the default starting point, but 
can be foregone with events and cases of lower significance (where not required by law). In 
the case of a one-off event, all security precautions remain on the shoulders of the organizing 
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entity, thus the procurement of a third-party security service or usage of corporate security 
professionals from within the company need to have a say in the preparations. Outsourcing 
can also be used to bolster and reinforce the already possessed expertise of the company. 
Methods and advantages of outsourcing were examined in chapter 3.3.1.  
 
Additionally, one is to observe a distinct lack of relevant security training and education in 
Finland, with the exception of the degree programmes in Laurea University of Applied Scienc-
es. Majority of security entrepreneurs and actors originate from the ranks of the military, po-
lice or have been procured from abroad, where more specialized education is available and 
the demand for such is greater. Prior to the establishment of the degree programmes, the 
security scene in Finland (thus Helsinki) relied solely on these career officers thus resulting in 
a variety of schools under the security umbrella, where each individual ex-officer had their 
own methods and the regulation was slightly looser. Thankfully, corrective measures were 
taken to provide the current labour market with corporate security professionals possessing 
the right kind of professional toolkit, while also creating a framework of comparison for high-
er education in the field of security. This amendment will have affected and contributed to 
the high level of professionalism observable today, resulting in the augmentation of the level 
of security and thus boosting the event security subset further. 
 
4.1 Comments 
 
While by no means surprising, the results clearly bring out aspects to be improved, which can 
only taken as a positive outcome. Translating this into the level and amount of security edu-
cation provided in universities and professional schools would have a tremendous impact on 
the field as a whole. 
 
Slightly unpredictably, the collection of research data was, for the most part, facile and read-
ily available. However, the issues where exact information and in-depth knowledge would 
have given this thesis much more academic substance, the data was extremely restricted or 
classified in its entirety. This can be forgiven for law enforcement instances, but the with-
drawal of important research information compelled me to make changes into the outlining 
and core definitions of this thesis. Research on this field is often confined to the internals of 
government agencies and private security companies, but high-level public research into it 
demands an opening. As a principle, academic research should be free and not swayed with 
corporate or governmental bias.  Withdrawal of key information has its place, but also affects 
the broader evolution of the field when the quality and amount of research stagnates. As a 
researched opinion, my recommendation for the field of event security (and security in gen-
eral) is increasing the amount of research into its core issues and subsequently educating the 
actors dealing with them. This does not confine it to be solely security professionals, but also 
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corporate managers who are in charge of security expenditure. Additionally, as the manner in 
which security is to be implemented should embed it into the core processes of the entity 
(i.e. event), all actors (for example: communications, human resources, finances, catering 
etc.) should possess at least basic understanding of corporate security principles. 
 
4.2 Further research 
 
Unfolding the wrapper of the current situation reveals certain aspects where academic re-
search and professional growth should have their place. As mentioned above, the aspects are 
the minimal level preparedness and the lack of proper security knowledge on the part of the 
event organizers (and more widely in the corporate world). 
 
Professional growth through research is an ideal model, where, through new research data, 
new content could be embedded into the syllabuses of the security training establishments 
(notably Laurea UAS and professional schools). On the basis of this thesis’ content, a recom-
mendation on research subjects benefitting the proposed approach would include: 
 Analysis on the effect of the location (venue) of the event to the behaviour of guests 
and security incidents 
 Analysis on the differences in outcomes where the security service provider is in-
house personnel/contracted 
 External communication with regards to high-security events 
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